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Action needed by governments, universities

ASAA plan to reignite study of Asia

White Paper submission highlights crisis in Asian studies.

With Asian studies in Australia in crisis, it is imperative that those in the field reignite the study of Asia, says the Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA) in a submission to the Australian Government's White Paper on Australia in the Asian Century.

The submission—'Creating and transmitting Australia's knowledge of a dynamic Asia'—recommends wide-ranging measures for governments and universities to encourage the study of Asia. These include the promotion and extension of postgraduate scholarships for study in Asia and the creation of an Australian equivalent of a Fulbright scholarship to be awarded annually to three distinguished scholars, authors or officials from Asia.

'When the ASAA conducted its 2002 *Maximizing Australia's Asia knowledge: repositioning and renewal of a national asset* study, its authors consciously rejected the word 'crisis', the submission says. 'A decade later we cannot but use "crisis" to describe the state of Asian studies in Australia.'

'The capacity of our universities to teach about and research Asian societies, politics, histories and economies has declined still further.'

The submission calls for a range of 'straightforward, concrete and economical programs that creatively incorporate existing resources to support effective teaching of Asian languages, encourage young Australians to pursue study of Asia, and rebuild high-quality undergraduate and postgraduate programs in most of our universities'.

'Our association argued with a weight of evidence in 2005 that the national ability to understand and communicate with our neighbours in Asia had stalled at an 'illogically low level'. The imperative to address this national need to embrace Asian studies at this historical moment early in the Asian century is even greater now. We in Asian studies need to reignite the study of Asia in Australia.'

The ASAA submission says universities need to produce graduates with Asian language skills not just to do business but to teach these languages to Australians in schools and elsewhere. Yet data indicates that Asian language enrolments, which fell significantly in the late 1990s, still continue to fall and in some areas—such as Indonesian—drastically.

In 2001, less than 5 per cent of university students studied Asia in any way, while only 3 per cent studied an Asian language.

'We therefore strongly urge knowledge creation and transmission to build our national Asia literacy and capacity to

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ASAA plan to reignite study of Asia

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maximise opportunities now before us.' To achieve these aims, the ASAA says Australia must:

- learn from past experience
- set up networks and systems to identify and creatively incorporate existing resources to maximise promotion of Asia literacy inside the education system at all levels
- promote deeper understanding of the importance of knowledge creation and transmission, to inform and prepare Australian society for maximising opportunities for mutual benefit with counterparts in Asian societies
- create the capacity for effective and sustainable teaching in school programs by including Asian content in teaching degrees, with at least one semester's study in Asia.

Universities need to acknowledge that the 'one size fits all' approach to university language programs cannot be applied to all Asian languages and to act on the under-standing that good courses attract and hold students, and therefore contribute to Asia literacy.

The ASAA also recommends coordinating Asian studies within university programs by 'mainstreaming Asia' inside and across programs, and specialised centres.

The submission also recommends:

- funding up to 40 postgraduate study-in-Asia language fellowships at an average annual value of $25 000 each for advanced students to study language and develop scholarly interests and personal connections for a year in a country of Asia.
- encouraging PhD students to persevere with in-country fieldwork in Asia with a 'fieldwork fellowship' of $25 000 per research student
- creating an Australian equivalent of a Fulbright scholarship, to be awarded annually to three distinguished scholars, authors or officials from Asia.

See ASAA website for full submission.

Further reading

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Further information: Professor Purnendra Jain, ASAA President, or at 08 8303 4688

Report calls for public commitment to Indonesian language studies

Indonesian language teaching is disappearing from Australian universities.

An explicit public commitment by the Australian Government and Opposition to supporting Indonesian language teaching in Australian universities until 2020 is one of 20 recommendations in a new report on the crisis in Indonesian language teaching in Australia.

The report, *Indonesian language in Australian universities: strategies for a stronger future*, by Professor David T. Hill, Chair of South-East Asian Studies at Murdoch University, details the crisis in Indonesian language teaching in Australian universities and schools and makes 20 recommendations to strengthen Australia's Indonesian language skills.

The report—prepared under a National Teaching Fellowship from the Australian Learning and Teaching Council—also recommends that Australian governments, through the education ministers, establish a national taskforce on Indonesian language.

The taskforce's role would be to coordinate, advocate for, promote and stimulate Indonesian language teaching and learning across all sectors of the education system, and to oversee and coordinate the implementation of a national Indonesian language-in-universities program.

Enrolments in Indonesian nationally dropped by about 40 per cent, at a time when the overall undergraduate population in universities expanded by nearly 40 per cent.

Arguing that a healthy working relationship with Indonesia is vital to both Australia's present and future national interest, the report says Australians' preparedness to learn the Indonesian language is a key indicator of the perceptions of Indonesia that exist within the Australian community.

'It is a quantifiable measure of Australians' interest in, knowledge of, and engagement with Indonesia,' the report says. 'It is also a measure of the community support for the idea of closer ties between Australia and Indonesia—support without which government policy efforts are unlikely to succeed.

'Our ability to communicate comfortably and confidently in the Indonesian language is essential if we are to continue to enhance mutual understanding and respect, facilitate the exchange of ideas and boost productive collaboration in all aspects of the bilateral relationship, including—but certainly not limited to—our economic partnership.'

The report says a series of troubling political events in Indonesia over the past 15 years, compounded by negative coverage of these events by the Australian media, has unnerved Australians and discouraged them from learning Indonesian.

In schools, there were fewer Year 12 students studying Indonesian in 2009 than there were in 1972. In universities, during the decade from 2001 to 2010, national enrolments in Indonesian dropped by about 40 per cent, at a time when the overall undergraduate population in universities expanded by nearly 40 per cent. In New South Wales, Indonesian language enrolments during this period fell by more than 50 per cent.

'If this rate of decline continues, and assuming all other factors remain constant, by 2021 Indonesian will have virtually disappeared from universities in all states and territories except Victoria and the Northern Territory. Unless Australia reinvests in Indonesian studies, the report says, we risk losing the comparative advantage provided by linguistic expertise,

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Call for commitment to Indonesian language studies

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and the consequent economic, political and strategic benefits from our relationship with Indonesia.'

Since 2006, Indonesian has been designated a Nationally Strategic Language in the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations funding agreements with universities. Yet no accompanying funding has been provided to support this. Instead, universities are closing Indonesian programs.

The report proposes an overarching national Indonesian language-in-universities program and puts forward 20 specific recommendations.

The cost of funding the recommendations that directly relate to universities is $98 million over the next decade. Such calls upon the Commonwealth Budget at a time of stated fiscal restraint, the report argues, would be outweighed by the cost of permitting Australia's expertise in Indonesian to ebb away at precisely a period of renewed economic growth in Indonesia.

Silk Road exhibition opens

A new international exhibition, **'**Travelling the Silk Road: ancient pathway to the modern world'**,** has opened at the National Museum of Australia in Canberra. It features the world's oldest international highway over a spans of six centuries (AD 600 to 1200) and showcases four representative cities: Xi'an, China's Tang Dynasty capital; Turfan, a bustling oasis; Samarkand, home of the prosperous merchants; and Baghdad, a meeting place for scholars, scientists, and philosophers.

Developed by the American Museum of Natural History, New York, the exhibition The exhibition is on show until 29 July 2012. For further information, see the website.

Registrations open for 19th ASAA conference

Registrations are now open for the ASAA's 19th Biennial Conference, which will be held at the University of Western Sydney (Parramatta South Campus), 11–13 July, 2012.

The organisers have already confirmed an impressive list of speakers, including three keynote speakers: Professor Lily Kong, Vice-President (University and Global Relations), and acting Executive Vice-President (Academic Affairs), Yale–NUS College, National University of Singapore; Professor Jie-Hyun Lim, Professor of History, Director of the Research Institute of Comparative History and Culture, Hanyang University, Seoul; and Professor Prasenjit Duara, Raffles Professor of Humanities, Director, Asia Research Institute, and Director of Research, Humanities & Social Sciences, National University of Singapore.

The Malaysia and Singapore Society of Australia 17th James Jackson Memorial Lecture will be delivered by Professor Wang Gungwu (National University of Singapore) on 'The call for Malaysia: fifty years on'.

Two South Asia Studies Association invited speakers have also been confirmed: Professor Kumaraswamy (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) on 'India's energy security and implications for Australia', and Professor Lord Desai (London School of Economics) on 'The pace of economic reform in India'.

A plenary panel, 'Australia in the Asian Century' will reflect on the Australian Government White Paper, which is being produced by a task force led by Dr Ken Henry (see story page 1). The panel will be chaired by Professor Krishna Sen (University of Western Australia). Confirmed speakers include Dr Richard C. Smith AO (former Ambassador to China) and John Menadue AO (former Ambassador to Japan).

The closing plenary session, 'The future of Asian studies in Australia,' will be led by Professor Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Professor of Japanese History, School of Culture, History & Language, Australian National University (ANU); Professor [emeritus] Anthony Reid, Department of Political & Social Change, ANU; and Professor Maurizio Marinelli, Director,

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China Research Centre, University of Technology, Sydney. Other conference highlights will include the Japanese Studies Association of Australia's sessions on language education, with invited speaker Professor Hiroko Kataoka (California State University) presenting on 'Japanese language education for heritage speakers: issues and strategies'. A workshop, 'Providing continuing learning pathways for learners of Japanese', will be facilitated by Professor Chihiro Thomson (University of New South Wales).

The ASAA Women's Forum will feature invited speaker Professor Gaphee Ko (Hanshin University) on 'Glocal feminism, glocal activism'.

The conference—'Knowing Asia: Asian Studies in an Asian century'—is being hosted by the University of Western Sydney's Institute for Culture and Society, the School of Humanities and Communication Arts, and the Centre for the Study of Contemporary Muslim Societies.

Further information about the conference is available from the conference website.

North Asia: transition and change

The new face of China

Political bargaining and jockeying has begun as China prepares to elect new leaders.

Yongwook Ryu

In the autumn of 2012 the 18th Party Congress will convene in Beijing and elect the new leaders of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Although attention will be fixated on Xi Jinping and whether he will assume the top party and military positions, the leadership change in PRC is more than the change of the top person. It is the change of the oligarchs who collectively run the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the nation's de facto highest decision-making body. Who will likely be the next group of China's leaders? What will it mean for China's future, especially in its relations with the external world?

The process of leadership change in the PRC is a complex and opaque one with political bargaining and jockeying between different factions and leaders. In principle, it is a bottom-up process, with the election of 2270 delegates this year from 40 delegations to the Party Congress, which then elects the CCP Central Committee consisting of approximately 350 members. The Central Committee then elects the members of the Politburo (currently 25 members), which in turn chooses the PSC members (currently nine members).


Hu Jintao

However, the process is in fact top-down[1], with party leaders exerting significant influence on the selection of delegates or members at all levels, from the Party Congress to the PSC. As in all past party congressional gatherings, this year's congress will also see a major turnover of personnel. Approximately 60 per cent of the members of the Central Committee will likely be new members.[2]

More importantly, based on the age restriction, seven of the nine current members of the PSC will step down, including Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, and an additional seven Politburo members are expected to retire from their positions.[3] If other Politburo members retire for reasons such as health, or are removed for political wrongdoings, the magnitude of turnover will be even greater.

There are several factors that are important in predicting who will become the next leaders of the PRC. The first is age. The 17th Congress set a precedent that anyone who reaches the age of 68 will have to retire, and this 'rule' is likely to be followed at the 18th Congress. The second factor is administrative experience and proven record of success, an element of meritocracy in the otherwise authoritarian system.

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The PSC oversees all major policy issues, from foreign and military affairs, legislative affairs, ideology and propaganda, internal security, party discipline, party apparatus, and matters relating to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao. Hence those candidates with relevant administrative experience in these established policy sectors, such as Liu Yunshan, Propaganda Department chief, and Meng Jianzhu, state councillor for internal security, would have a good chance of making it into the PSC.

Win Jiabao

And the final and perhaps most important factor is patron–client relations and factional balance. The outgoing party leaders will seek to appoint candidates who are closer to them and ensure a balance between different factions and constituencies, so that they could continue to exert their influence even after they retire from their official duties. People like Zhang Gaoli and Ling Jihua have a good chance of being in the next PSC, precisely because they are protégés of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, respectively.

Despite a large change in the composition of the PSC, Hu Jintao is likely to retain the top military post in the Central Military Commission for several more years, following Jiang Zemin's precedent. In addition, surprises could happen. Although Xi Jinping appears to have secured his position as the next top leader—his recent visit to the United States supports this—as the recent Bo Xilai saga illustrates, the fortunes of potential candidates can change very quickly and unexpectedly.

Bo Xilai … changed fortunes.

The composition of the PSC will have a significant impact on the ideological emphasis and policy direction of China in the coming years. While all leaders agree on the CCP's one-party rule, communist ideology, economic growth and Taiwan, there are some important differences of emphasis between the Hu Jintao-led *tuan pai* faction and the 'princelings'. The former's priority is on social justice, equality and political reform such as the eradication of corruption and promotion of democratic processes. In contrast, the latter emphasises fast economic growth led by coastal cities, market liberalisation, the reform of the state-owned enterprises, and urbanisation.

On Taiwan, with the re-election of Ma Ying-jeou earlier this year, the new leadership of the PRC will continue to deepen the cross-strait relations, and hence we are likely to see a period of relative stability.

On relations with United States and other regional actors such as Japan, China will feel more confident in voicing its opinions and protecting its interests. To be sure, this trend has more to do with the shifting power balance in the region than leadership change in the PRC, but the new leaders, lacking revolutionary credentials and charisma, might find themselves increasingly attracted to growing nationalism as a source of their political legitimacy.

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Japan—not there yet, but on the way

Beneath the evident insecurity and pessimism of Japan there is a persistent undercurrent of change.

Rikki Kersten

On the face of it, Japan in 2012 appears to be hovering between insecurity and instability. The passing parade of prime ministers over the past five years—six prime ministers so far, with a regime change to boot—invites scepticism concerning Japan's ability to manage its own affairs. Add to this the devastation of the March 2011 disasters and the ensuing crisis of confidence on the part of civil society in its government, and Japan seems to be on a self-defeating spiral into self-doubt and relative decline.

Set against the shining colossus of rising China and the simmering menace of North Korea, Japan seems ill-equipped to confront the existential challenges these neighbouring countries represent. How can this Japan develop, let alone implement, policy over the long term that will reinvent and revitalise the world's third largest economy, society and polity? Where can we find evidence of leadership to this end?

While the challenges confronting Japan are formidable, we cannot hope to discern progress or potential merely by asking 'are we there yet?' Beneath the evident insecurity and pessimism there is a persistent undercurrent of change. The degree of instability and uncertainty is in direct proportion to the profound nature of changes underway in Japanese politics.

When viewed as evidence of transition, the current instability and angst offer us insights into the pervasive national transformation that is occurring in Japan. Japan's unsettling journey from a miracle economy to a post-miracle economy, and from a one-party dominant system to a two-party system, entails cascading change in Japan's institutional culture and governance structures that will inevitably be messy, spasmodic and piecemeal. We are not there yet, but we are definitely on our way.

It is tempting to take the array of problems evident in Japanese society today as proof of crisis instead of transformation. At the top of the list is the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which appears to have disappointed the high expectations placed upon it after its historic election victory in August 2009.

Naoto Kan

The political demise of Yukio Hatoyama and of Naoto Kan, both through perceived incompetence, could be interpreted as the failure of the shift away from one-party dominance under the Liberal Democratic Party. But the election of the DPJ was only a catalyst for the deeper levels of change that are now underway; it was never going to be a neat beginning to a new political system. Instead, the tribulations of the DPJ reveal the realignment of the political spectrum, the repositioning of old and emerging political affiliations, and new connections between these forces and policy positions.

The electorate is assuming oversight of government with a determination that is unprecedented in modern times.

The context of socioeconomic crisis does not negate this process; rather it adds momentum and necessity to the transformation journey. Japan's rapidly ageing society, the negative birth rate, the low workforce participation rate of females, the sky-high 200 per cent ratio of debt to GNP, the tragedy of high suicide rates (remaining at a high level from 1998 through to the present) and now the large-scale destruction of communities and property, and contamination of land and life in the Tohoku region are an unenviable inventory of problems. To put it crudely, it is self-evident that something has to give. These issues together represent fuel for the will and

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energy that will be required to perform the scale of change that is necessary for Japan to move forward. Despite the despair and insecurity that is tangible in Japanese society, the electorate remains committed to change. This can be measured in the rise and rise of unaffiliated voters, who now hover around the 60 per cent range. The laudable activism of volunteers and NGOs in the Tohoku recovery effort is indicative of the social energy that has arisen in a civil society that no longer sits back and assumes that government will meet the needs of the day. The electorate is critically engaged and is actively assuming oversight of government with a determination that is unprecedented in modern times.

Toru Hashimoto

Another indicator of the mood of the voting public is its positive attitude towards emerging political forces. Osaka Mayor Tōru Hashimoto with his One Osaka Party, and Aichi governor Hideaki Omura's Tokai Aspiration School, are new and unorthodox political forces that are speaking to an electorate that has not given up on 'new politics'. This more than anything shows us that the stumblings of the DPJ have not signified the end of commitment to change in Japanese politics in the eyes of the public. The election of the DPJ was not an end goal of political change, instead it was one part of a multistage process that is nowhere near its conclusion.

The most difficult aspect of the current transitional situation in Japan is that the end goal is obscure, and the timeframe for change protracted. There is a danger that the realignment process will take so long that Japan will miss the window of opportunity for change that crisis has delivered. But the existence of change itself means that things are moving, and we can but hope that sociopolitical energy will lead Japan to a democratic future that its people still aspire to despite the trauma of recent times.

Rikki Kersten is Professor of Modern Japanese Political History at the Australian National University.

Sydney appoints China experts

The University of Sydney has appointed two internationally regarded experts to head up its China Studies Centre.

Dr Kerry Brown will take up the role of professor and executive director of the centre, and Professor David Goodman will become the academic director.

Dr Brown is currently head of the Asia Programme at Chatham House and Leader of the Europe China Research and Advice Network, funded by the European Union and offering advice directly into the European External Action Service.

'Dr Brown is one of the key analysts of today's debate on attitudes toward China,' said Dr Michael Spence, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sydney.

Dr Brown has held a number of high level diplomatic, government and think tank posts as well as holding affiliations with various academic institutions in China, at Cambridge, the London School of Oriental and African Studies and Nottingham University.

Professor Goodman is currently the acting director of the China Studies Centre and Professor of Chinese Politics at the university. He was previously the Director of the East Asia Centre at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Chair of the Asian Studies Program and Director of the Asia Research Centre at Murdoch University.

At University of Technology, Sydney he established and developed the Institute for International Studies and later became pro vice-chancellor, and then deputy vice-chancellor International. More recently, he was the director of the university's Institute of Social Sciences and Associate Dean International within the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences.

Established in 2011 ,the centre has more than 130 academic staff engaged in the study of China and facilitates cross disciplinary research and teaching as well as extensive public programs.

Leadership transition on the Korean Peninsula: control and change

The implications of a change in leaders in the two Koreas will have equally significant international implications.

Hyung-A Kim

Given the current period of leadership transition on the Korean peninsula, with the death of Kim Jong Il in the North and presidential elections due in the South in December this year, issues of control and change are likely to dominate the political scene in the immediate future.

But apart from the domestic political significance of this dual transition, the implications of a change in leaders in the two Koreas will have equally significant international implications, particularly in regard to finding a way to deal with the North Korean nuclear stalemate. In fact, there can be no genuine security in the Asia–Pacific region without solving the Korean problem, especially the North Korean nuclear issue.

Let's examine the nature of the leadership transition in each of the two Koreas, and ask what that transition will mean, especially in terms of managing control and change on each side of the peninsula.

South Korea

The 2012 presidential election poses an intriguing choice for the South Korean populace. At this stage there appear to be three possible leading contenders: Park Kun-Hye, Mun Jae In and Ahn Cheol Soo. Ahn is a software mogul and university professor who purports to represent youth's political dissent, and is indeed most popular among those aged in their 20s and 30s.

Despite his popularity, however, Ahn's intention as to whether he would enter the presidential election as a candidate is unclear, and yet the unpredictable Ahn's move makes both the conservative and progressive camps shake in their boots.

Park Kun-Hye, daughter of former President Park Chung Hee, is a leading figure in the recently renamed conservative New World Party and former president of the Grand National Party. Park promotes 'fundamental change' focused on welfare as a new platform for her party, just as Mun Jae In, a human rights lawyer and former chief of staff to President Roh Moo Hyun (2003–08), is promoting economic democracy as a key member of the progressive Democratic United Party.

Park Kun-Hye

The country is beset by deepening socioeconomic polarisation.

These possible presidential candidates are confronted by an angry Korean society, especially at the grassroots level, which holds widespread anti-Lee Myung-Bak sentiment.

Allegations of corruption surround President Lee's cronies and party, and the country is beset by deepening socioeconomic polarisation. There is also a public rejection of the current stalemate in inter-Korea relations.

In response to public sentiment, both the conservative New World Party and the progressive Democratic United Party have promised welfare measures amounting to approximately $84 billion and $164 billion respectively. Both parties also promote softer approaches in inter-Korea relations.

Overall, the leadership transition in South Korea would essentially mean a sea change in domestic political dynamics, with an emphasis on economic democratisation.

North Korea

The leadership transition in North Korea to new leader Kim Jung Un (KJU) since December 2011, 2011, in stark contrast,

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means KJU's new system of managing control. Despite the obvious absence of his leadership experience, his immaturity and many other flaws, the North under KJU's third-generation hereditary leadership succession appears to have changed little, especially in regard to North Korea's control strategy via its missile and nuclear plans.

Just 16 days after agreeing (29 February 2012) to suspend long-range missile tests in return for 240 000 tons of US food aid, Pyongyang announced its satellite test plan in April. This drew echoing condemnations from the United States and its allies, as well as a public appeal to Pyongyang by Chinese President Hu Jintao at the recent Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul asking the North to give up its launch plans.

The Juche Tower, Pyongyang

Why this contradiction? What does the North aim to achieve by this? Despite the condemnations and appeals, together with the guessing games, Pyongyang does not appear willing to give up its plan. On the contrary, this plan appears to be aimed at demonstrating KJU's leadership succession in the most symbolic and technologically 'advanced' way, by projecting it as a system for *Kangsong daeguk*, or Strong and Great Nation, just as Kim Jong Il perfected the politics of so-called *Songgun*, or 'military-first' policy. After all, symbolism is highly important to North Korea, particularly for propaganda.

The bottom line is that KJU cannot afford to be seen as a 'weak' leader, especially at a critical time in the North when two most important events will mark the centenary of Kim Il Sung's birthday (15 April) and the founding of the North Korean Army (25 April).

KJU needs to maintain the stability of his leadership succession at all costs by consolidating his power base with the support of the military power elite on the one hand, and maintaining the stability of North Korean society by focusing on *Juche* (self-reliance) ideology and the *Songun* policy of both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. KJU also needs to build his control over the military and hardline military elites who, according to some analysts, may have sent a hardline message with the announcement of the rocket launch. In this respect, 2012 will be a critical year to watch how KJU's leadership succession will transform itself into a new system of control in North Korea, where chronic food shortages and the malnutrition of citizens have reached a critical point.

There can be no genuine security in the Asia–Pacific region without solving the North Korean nuclear issue.

Some Korean analysts argue that the United States must send a high-level envoy to negotiate with Pyongyang separate to the Six-Party Talks among the United States, China, Japan and Russia in addition to the two Koreas. They also argue that a hardline diplomacy based on punishment is not the answer, considering the record of the Lee Myung Bak administration's hardline measures against the launching of a missile and the second nuclear test (2009), as well as the sinking of the navy ship, *Cheonan*, and the attack on Yeonpyong Island (2010).

Kim Jong Il

In this sense, KJU's North appears to continue where his father left off, seeking direct talks and an agreement with Washington. But this would require political capital, and a bold change of approach from President Obama who, at this time, cannot afford that, at least not while he is heading towards his re-election in November.

Despite many differences and non-negotiable issues, however, a chance for a real breakthrough still depends on how the US can find a way to negotiate with North Korea. For this groundbreaking step, South Korea and other neighbouring countries also need to change their approach.

Of course China is the biggest factor in how the North may change under KJU. China has multiple interests in North Korea, including a wish that it remains stable. Also that China's economic interests are protected while keeping while keeping North Korea as a buffer

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for China's regional security against the United States and the West more broadly.

As already noted, there can be no genuine security in the Asia–Pacific region without solving the North Korean nuclear issue. In this respect, the leadership transition on the Korean peninsula could bring new opportunities, with active roles from the United States, China, other neighbouring countries and the international community.

Hyung-A Kim is Associate Professor of Korean Politics at the College of Asia and the Pacific in the Australian National University.

Through children's eyes

As part of the annual Head On Photo Festival, 'Messages for our children—3/11: a new beginning' will be shown at the Japan Foundation Gallery in Sydney from 10 May to 2 June.

Sixty images will be on exhibit, the majority taken by children and youth in the areas affected by the earthquake and tsunami.

The exhibition will be at the Japan Foundation Gallery, Level 1, Chifley Plaza, 2 Chifley Square, Sydney, from 10 May to 2 June, Monday–Saturday, 11am–4pm.

Putri Munawaroh: martyr or victim?

A controversial trial has raised questions about the future development of female involvement in terrorist activity in Indonesia.

Sally White

On 17 September 2009, in a raid on a home in Surakarta, Central Java, by Indonesia's antiterrorist police, officers killed four men, including Noordin M. Top, the mastermind of a number of bombings in Indonesia, including the Ritz Carlton and Marriot hotels in Kuningan, Jakarta.

The house was rented by one of those killed, Hadi Susilo, and his pregnant wife, Putri Munawaroh. Putri was shot in the thigh.



Seven days later, she was formally charged with offences under Indonesia's antiterrorism law.

On 20 December 2009, while in detention awaiting trial, she gave birth to a son, Muhammad Ahsan As Syuhada. She was indicted in February 2010 on charges of aiding the perpetrator of a terrorism crime by providing support for, and concealing the whereabouts of, those perpetrators, and of possession of firearms and explosives intended to be used in a terrorist act.

On 29 July, Putri Munawaroh was found guilty of the crime of aiding by concealment, and sentenced to three years prison.

These are the bare bones of the case. What the prosecution alleged at Putri's trial was that she and her husband had rented a house in April 2009, which they moved into in June of that year. In July, when Putri returned from a visit to her parents-in-law, Susilo informed her that a guest had arrived and would be staying with them.

Two weeks later, while Putri was visiting a neighbour, a second guest arrived, then later a third, although the three guests were not always there concurrently. While the guests were in the home, they stayed in their room. Putri prepared food, which her husband gave to them. When Putri left the house, she locked it.

According to the prosecution, Putri knew that the men staying in her home were wanted terrorists. They argued that Putri Munawaroh was a willing participant in concealing the men and their activities, and that she harboured radical views which influenced her behaviour.

Putri's defence team, on the other hand, argued that Putri had no knowledge of the identity of the guests, and was simply being a dutiful Muslim wife. Putri claimed never to have seen the faces

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of her guests; she knew them only according to certain characteristics. Her defence team argued that this fact, and her behaviour, were completely in accord with families where *hijab* (the strict separation of the sexes) was observed. In such families, there is no interaction between male guests who were not *mahram* (close kin) and the wife. Her team stated that Putri locked the house to protect their belongings, and that under Indonesian law she could not be held accountable for criminal deeds committed by her husband.

Women's involvement in terrorist networks in Indonesia to date has largely been in support roles. Only four women have been charged under the antiterrorism law and they were all charged with offences that supported the commission of a crime, such as concealing whereabouts or knowledge. Thus, compared to some other terrorist movements elsewhere in the world, women have not played active roles in violent activity in Indonesia.

There is, however, anecdotal evidence that women were involved more directly in Poso and Ambon in fighting (or at least stone throwing), smuggling weapons, and logistical support. There is evidence that women have played other roles, including recruitment, providing financial support, acting as go-betweens and passing on messages, particularly when their husbands are in prison, educating their children in the way of *jihad*, and helping their husbands to escape arrest after committing a terrorist act.

The question here is, do the actions and words of Putri Munawaroh and the discourse surrounding her case represent an increased radicalisation of women, and thus the potential for a greater level of involvement in jihadist activity in Indonesia?

In October 2009, police reported a statement allegedly made by Putri Munawaroh, 'why didn't you just shoot me dead?' During her trial, the prosecution argued that it was the intention of Putri and Susilo to die as martyrs. Rumours also circulated that Putri had told police that the child in her womb would take revenge on them by bombing the police hospital and headquarters in 17 years time, rumours Putri's counsel denied.

The record of interrogation for Putri gives credence to the claim she wanted to die as a martyr. When asked why she did not follow the order immediately to give herself up during the raid, she answered, 'I didn't want to follow the order because I too wanted to be a martyr, because I wanted to protect the guests, because my guests are kings and I had to honour those guests.'

When the court's verdict was imminent, an SMS campaign urged Muslims to attend the hearing as an act of solidarity. A 'Coins for Putri' campaign was also launched. On the day, a large banner was unfurled by women in the courtroom, which read 'Free Putri Munawaroh and her baby from the tyranny of Detachment 88 (the police detachment that carried out the raid in which her husband died) and its allies'. When the women were ejected, they held a rowdy demonstration outside.

Back inside the courtroom, other supporters refused to stand when the presiding judge entered the court, and yelled insults when the sentence was read out. One woman is quoted as saying: 'Putri is utterly innocent. This is all oppression against the Muslims on the pretext of combating terrorism. If we are accused of being terrorists, then give birth to the terrorists from your womb, O mothers.'

Is this evidence of a growing militancy of women? It is certainly evidence of greater vocality of women, of women standing up for what they argue is an injustice done to one of their sisters. But what we see when we examine the writings in the Islamist and jihadist press commenting on the Putri Munawaroh trial and the verdict is that the discourse is very much within the parameters of conservative gender ideology.

Putri does not, in the trial, project herself as a martyr to the cause of Islam—she does not reject the validity of the court because it is not based on Islamic law, she is said to have been respectful and polite throughout the trial, and this is one of the facts cited by the head judge as a mitigating factor in her three-year sentence (the prosecution had asked for eight).

At the trial of another suspected terrorist,

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Putri Munawaroh: martyr or victim?

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Putri appeared to retract her statement that she wanted to die as a martyr. She explained that she was very scared, in panic, and thought she was going to die. If she did die, she wanted it to be as a martyr,

but in fact, she did not want to die. And this was the line of argument she used in her own trial also. Her defence team claimed that it was impossible for the prosecution to prove Putri's intention to die as a martyr, and given the responsibility she carried for the child in her womb, it was inconceivable that she could ever have formed that intent.

Putri's case was followed closely in the Islamist and jihadist media, and was discussed in forums and blogs. Putri is constantly referred to as *mujahidah* (female fighter), and there are occasional references comparing her to other Muslim women. For example, in 'An open letter in the name of love to Putri Munawaroh' which appeared on a number of websites, the author laments that he is unable to do anything to save Putri from her fate, and calls her a 'chosen woman', like Ummu Umarah, Ummu Sulaim (both historical figures), Munfiatun (Noordin Top's second wife and the first woman tried and found guilty under antiterrorism laws), and several female Muslim suicide bombers, thus linking her to very strong images of women as terrorist perpetrators.

Putri Munawaroh testifying.

Another article links Putri to other women imprisoned by the *kafir* (unbelievers). Putri Munawaroh is also situated in a trope of devout Muslim women oppressed by a *thogut* (antiIslam) state—hence the references on the banner to Detachment 88 and their allies. But on the whole, most of the coverage in the Islamist media has less to do with placing Putri and her situation in a global context, and more do with her, as a woman, in a very localised context. There is a great deal of anger and outrage expressed that a woman who was only doing her duty to her husband and his guests finds herself on trial and then in jail, especially given what she has already suffered on a personal level.

Her fate is compared unfavourably with that of corruptors, whose wives remain free and are never brought to account for complicity in their husband's crimes. Her fate makes her a figure of pity, and although her strength is admired, what comes over very clearly is the belief she has been unjustly treated, that she is not guilty, and has been victimised because of the state's preoccupation with terrorism crimes and its part in the global war on terror. As one author expressed it: 'Putri Munawaroh is only a village girl, a Muslim woman who is trying to live in accord with sharia Islam, and trying to be obedient and submissive to her husband, accompanying him until the end of his life came'.

The real hero in much of the reporting is not Putri herself, but her husband Susilo. It emerged early on in the investigation into the events that Susilo used his body to shield his wife, and this heroic deed is continually referred to in the accounts of Putri and her trial. As the 'Open letter in the name of Putri Munawaroh' referred to above stated: 'Sister Putri, we understand if you sometimes remember your husband. For us, he is an extraordinary figure in protecting his family. How could that not be when his final deed was to struggle with great strength to defend and protect you and Syuhada?'

While there are some strong images of Putri, as mentioned above, on the whole, reactions to her case place Putri in the position of passive victim, and her husband as the protector. Such reactions thus remain well within the parameters of essentially conservative gender ideology, not claiming or celebrating Putri as a true warrior, despite the constant references to her as a *mujahidah*.

Further, although the charge of aiding through concealment was found to be proven, the other charges against Putri which indicated a more active involvement, were not. As a result, we should be cautious in reading too much into the Putri Munawaroh case and what it represents for the future development of female involvement in terrorist activity in Indonesia.

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Invisible Australians

A new project combines digital methods and historical narrative to reveal the lives of non-white, non-Indigenous people in early 20th-century Australia.

Kate Bagnall

Willie Leon was a child of Melbourne's Chinatown. Orphaned after his father died on a trip to the United States, from the age of six Leon lived with Mrs Lou and her Chinese businessman husband in Celestial Avenue. He grew up knowing nothing of his own mother or even where he was born—but his later childhood was definitely Australian, albeit one lived in the heart of the Chinese community. Leon's working life began at age 13, when he left the Lou family's care to work in a Bourke Street café. Over the next 20 years he worked as a cook in a series of cafés in Sydney, Lakes Entrance, Gisborne and Melbourne.

Willie Leon, c. 1939. National Archives of Australia: B6531, LEFT COMMONWEALTH/1945-1947/LEON WILLIE

It was in a Melbourne café, the Oriental in Russell Street, that Customs Detective-Inspector James Gleeson spotted Willie Leon one day in July 1928. Growing up in Chinatown, Leon had perhaps never developed the fluid ease of a native speaker of English and Detective-Inspector Gleeson suspected that he was an illegal Chinese resident.

Gleeson took Leon to the Customs Department offices where he gave him the Dictation Test—in German, as was allowed under the Immigration Act. Leon failed the test, as he was surely expected to, and Gleeson arrested him as a prohibited immigrant.

When the matter came before the City Court, the magistrate ordered that Leon be deported. Leon appealed, however, and the Court of General Sessions heard him tell again the story of his life from age six. He remembered nothing before then. Leon's account was supported by that of other long-term Melbourne residents, who remembered him playing as a young child in Celestial Avenue. Without knowledge of his own parents or birthplace, Leon simply had no other way of proving that he was who he said he was, that he had not arrived recently or unlawfully, that he knew no other life than that in Australia.

Judge Foster in the General Sessions found that Leon had been resident in Victoria before Federation and that, therefore, he could not be counted as an 'immigrant' (or a 'prohibited immigrant') under federal law. 'Commonwealth power only extended to immigrants who came after the founding of the Commonwealth,' he declared (*Examiner*, 28 November 1928).

The story of Willie Leon's prosecution as a prohibited immigrant illustrates the precariousness that surrounded the lives of ethnic Chinese in Australia in the early decades of the 20th century. The White Australia Policy, whether explicitly stated or not, permeated the thinking and practices of many lawmakers, bureaucrats and officials—from parliamentarians who openly spoke of their distrust of the 'cunning and deceptive' Chinese, to Customs officers whose day-to-day work involved investigating and passing judgement on the identities of the Chinese they encountered.

While some Chinese Australians did not suffer the direct effects of institutional discrimination under the Immigration Restriction Act—or under the many other laws that placed restrictions on the rights of Chinese, Asiatics, 'aboriginal natives of Asia', or those 'not substantially of European descent'—they could not fail to be aware of the way in which their country viewed people of their race.

The Immigration Restriction Act was ostensibly designed to keep out unwanted arrivals of any race or nationality—criminals , prostitutes, the physically and mentally ill and the morally suspect, as well as 'coloureds'—yet it disrupted, or had the potential to disrupt, the lives of Australian-born Chinese and other long-established residents like Willie Leon. Leon is one of the thousands of

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Invisible Australians

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'invisible Australians' whose lives Dr Tim Sherratt and I are exploring as part of a new project to investigate the interactions of Chinese Australians, and those of other non-European backgrounds, with the bureaucracy of White Australia.

The administration of the Immigration Restriction Act created an enormous body of records that are today kept in National Archives of Australia offices around the country. These records include tens of thousands of certificates exempting from the Dictation Test, together with related application forms, photographs, correspondence, registers and indexes documenting the residency and travels of non-Indigenous, non-European people in Australia over the first half of the 20th century.

Certificate of exemption from Dictation Test for Ruby Wong Chee, 1908. National Archives of Australia: ST84/1, 1908/141-150

In the Invisible Australians project we will extract biographical information found in these administrative records to develop a better understanding of who exactly was affected by the White Australia Policy, and how. It can be easy to think that the policy was all words and ideas, abstract discussions about the shaping of a nation and its population, but in reality it had significant consequences for people who were, in fact, Australians. The administrative case files of individuals and families provide biographical and genealogical information—much of which is found nowhere else—as well as details of how these people interacted with the bureaucracy, including how they negotiated and resisted the restrictions placed upon them.

In time, the biographical information we extract will be linked to that found in other historical collections—for example, probate records, cemetery transcriptions, naturalisation papers and historical newspapers.

These might sound like grand plans for a project that we are undertaking independently and, so far, without any external funding. But a further part of the project will be exploring how crowdsourcing and emerging digital methods can facilitate both the extraction of the data and the formation of links between the records. For example, many of the records contain structured data, so we plan to develop a transcription tool that allows anyone to view a record online and simply copy the details to add to the Invisible Australians database.

Tim is also exploring innovative machine processing techniques. The Real Face of White Australia , for example, demonstrates how identity photographs can be automatically extracted from archival files and assembled in a way that allows people to connect with and explore the records online. Although only an experiment at this stage, this work has attracted significant international attention within the fields of digital humanities and archives.

Invisible Australians is all about connections—between datasets, archival collections and, most importantly, between the stories of past lives and us today. People like Willie Leon lived 'small lives' and left only faint traces in the historical record. In many cases, there are descendants and eager family historians ready to reclaim their stories, but perhaps not with Willie Leon. He never married and, after the court hearing, appears to have slipped quietly back into his life in inner-city Melbourne. Two decades later, aged in his 50s, he left Australia.

Invisible Australians hopes to reveal and tell the stories of the many thousands of people like Willie Leon who encountered the bureaucracy of White Australia. Without the stories of these individual lives, White Australia can all too easily stay in the realm of rhetoric and imagination.

Dr Kate Bagnall is an independent historian who lives and works in Canberra. For more on Invisible Australians go to www.invisibleaustralians.org or follow along on Twitter @InvisibleAus.

Australia's view of modern India 'outdated'

Australia needs to better understand Indian business thinking.

Richard Iles

Indian life becomes a sluggish stream, living in the past, moving slowly through the accumulation of dead centuries—Pandit Nehru, The discovery of India *(1946)*.

Outdated and narrow images of India abound. However, in the world of economic thought and business practice India is dynamic, hard-edged and likely to be the source of renewed economic thought.

However, Australian business and social views of India are sluggish, not having deepened for several decades. This neglect represents decay in real terms. India has developed rapidly over the past two decades, with many other developed countries strongly investing in their relationship with India during this time.

Australian research activity focused on India, as surveyed by the Australia–India Institute (UMelb), has declined steadily over several decades. The knowledge base from which the Australian business community, students and the wider community can draw to assist their investment in India has withered.

Prime Minister Julia Gillard's speech at Asialink announcing the White Paper on Australia's strategic approach to engaging with Asia reflects the narrow and simplistic view of modern India. She identified India as an English-speaking country, and therefore Western in its thought. This view shows a significant misunderstanding of India now, as well as the ingredients of India's exciting growth trajectory.

The simplification is damaging to Australia's economic national interests. It perpetuates the idea that conducting business in India is analogous to doing business in Western, English-speaking countries.

As India's self-confidence rises and it embraces its emerging identity as a global economic and strategic power, Australia's intellectual and business engagement with India takes on renewed importance. Continued under-investment in our understanding of modern India will limit our opportunities to grow with India and benefit from its growth.

Within India's business and intellectual communities, the calls are growing for distinctly Indian economic and business theory and practices to emerge and guide India's development. Western economic theory and business practice, which have never fitted well with India, are no longer viewed as the standard bearers.

Department of Business Management, University of Calcutta.

This call for Indian-specific theory and practice was the underlying theme of the Indian Institute of Management – Ahmedabad (ranked globally in the top 10 MBA programs by the *Financial Times*) Doctoral Colloquium in January 2012. The message was repeatedly expressed that the Indian paradigm is more important than the Western paradigm and is valued in the international context. Therefore, the need to borrow from the Western paradigm is more limited. Greater opportunities exist for expressing Indian ideas.

The Indian paradigm is likely to generate increased economic and business thinking that is increasingly distinct from Western logic and thought. Australia should be preparing to position itself to exploit the opportunities that will arise with distinctly Indian business thinking it one of the world's largest developing middle-class consumer markets.

The former Indian finance minister, Manmohan Singh, declared in his Budget speech on 24 July 1991, 'Let the whole world hear it loud and clear. India is now wide-awake. We shall prevail. We shall overcome'. In contrast to the portrayal of pre-independence India by Nehru and Australia's current sluggish views of India, the first set of economic reforms awakened a renewed period of Indian development, thought and self-expression.

India offers rich opportunities to those willing to take the time to appreciate it as it is now and as it sees itself. One measure of the

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Australia's outdated view of modern India

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increasing influence of Indian economic and business thought is the growing number of economic and business intellectual leaders of Indian origin heading up the world's leading business schools. A survey in the *Hindustan Times* (29 January 2012) outlines the growing list of economics and business academics of Indian origin leading business schools (Harvard University, University of Chicago, Cornell University, Dartmouth College), not to mention leading academics in various business fields.

Now is not the time to resign from actively engaging in India. Some notable Australian economists and Asia experts acknowledge that Australia has missed the boat with respect to business engagement with India. However, these thinkers are silent on how Australia is to re-energise a productive relationship (*Big Ideas*, 9 September 2011—ABC TV, hosted by the Australian National University and overseen by White Paper committee member Professor Peter Drysdale).

To appreciate and harness India's emergent economic opportunities, it is apparent that aspects of current business and social attitudes and perceptions of India need to change. Investment at personal, intellectual and business levels of engagement is necessary. For Australia to maximise the benefits of the free trade agreement currently being negotiated, strategic rethinking is necessary.

Examples of investment strategies in India from other countries give us some guide. The US Government is funding the Hindi–Urdu Flagship at the University of Texas. The US Government pays tuition fees for a degree in any area of study, as long as undergraduate students take a concurrent major in Hindi and Urdu. This represents a significant US investment in developing a greater understanding of Indian thought and practice.

GSK's UK headquarters.

The pharmaceutical company GSK (UK headquarters) is, for the first time, holding its global executive meeting in India in 2012. Although India makes up only approximately 8 per cent of GSK global sales, this decision recognises the emerging importance of India to the company. The meeting will expose all GSK's global leaders to issues and opportunities of doing business in India. Debate in Australia concerning our Asian engagement is already on the national agenda. In particular, this must now maturely encompass the importance of India to Australia's economic and business development.

Richard Iles is a PhD student in Economics at Griffith University and a visiting scholar at Delhi School of Economics, India.

Burma 'conversations now available

Asialink has published the proceedings of its 'Conversations' in Myanmar in February 2012.

With the support of the Myanmar Institute for Science and International Security, Asialink was one of the first Western organisations allowed into Myanmar to hold Track Two diplomacy discussions.

Asialink was joined by senior presidential advisors in the reformist government of President Thein Sein, Dr Thant Myint-U, well-known author of *The river of lost footsteps*, and other regional specialists such as Dewi Fortuna Anwar, advisor to the Indonesian government, and Sean Turnell, a world authority on the Myanmar economy.

During two days of meetings in the capital, Yangon, issues such as rebuilding Myanmar's economy, the country's moves towards democracy and nation building, relations with its neighbours China and India, and the government's peace negotiation with armed ethnic groups were discussed.

The report of proceedings are now available through the Asialink website.

Art and tradition in Bali

A Balinese village fills a niche in an increasingly urbanised Bali.

Siobhan Campbell

The island of Bali is home to many villages of traditional artists. These are often conceived, by Balinese and foreigners alike, as important vestiges of Bali's unique culture and free from the upheavals brought to the island by foreign culture and tourism. Kamasan in East Bali is one such village and is renowned as the centre of Bali's classical painting tradition. Yet far from being an isolated remnant of the past, Kamasan is an example of the intersecting relationships that exist between village and urban spaces in Bali.

In December 2010 new signs appeared above the roadway at the two main entrances to Kamasan. The signs differed little from the many road signs around the country marking the boundaries between villages, cities, districts and provinces. The text visible to those entering into the village simply announced *Desa Kamasan* (Kamasan village), while the message on the reverse, visible to those leaving, read *Desa Kamasan jangan dilupakan* (Don't forget Kamasan village).

I wondered to whom these signs were appealing. Were they specific to Kamasan or would they soon appear around the neighbouring villages? Were they directed at the small numbers of foreign and Indonesian visitors who come to the village—a plea not to leave Kamasan off their travel itineraries, or to take away happy memories of their visit? Perhaps they were a call to residents who had left the village to seek work on other parts of the island and beyond not to overlook their responsibilities to the village and the all-important remittances? Or maybe they were a general entreaty, on behalf of the village itself, not to be neglected in government-initiated development plans for the region.

The few people I asked dismissed the signs as part of a local-government initiative, although many more hadn't even noticed them. But less than a month after they appeared the signs were revised to read, simply, *terima kasih* (thank you).

Despite my inquiries within the village and with the local village administration, I failed to discover what or who was responsible for this shortlived entreaty not to forget Kamasan village—and why it had been so suddenly removed.

Located in the east of Bali, between the coast and the mountain ranges of Mount Agung, Kamasan is part of Klungkung, the smallest district of Bali. While today this part of Bali appears something of a backwater compared to the bustle in the south of the island, Klungkung has great historical significance.

Entrance to Kamasan village.

From around the 16th century Klungkung was the seat of the *Dewa Agung*, paramount ruler of Bali, who established a court in Gelgel. Kamasan was part of Bali's capital city, as it belongs to the *desa adat*, or customary village of Gelgel, and provided artisans to the royal court. The village is divided into *banjar*, or hamlets, reflecting these specialised services, including the gold and silversmiths of Banjar Pande Mas, the metalsmiths of Banjar Pande and the painters of Banjar Sangging, whose name means craftsperson or artist.

The narrative painting produced by these artists is generally referred to as classical painting, or *wayang*, and has roots in the shadow puppet theatre. Although a similar style of painting was once practised throughout Bali and still exists among small numbers of artists elsewhere, Kamasan is the only village where it has not been superseded by newer styles and materials. Paintings are produced on cloth in a variety of formats and, while in the past they were used primarily in temples or the pavilions of courtly homes, they are now also found in art galleries, museum collections, hotels, government offices, private homes and souvenir shops throughout Bali and the world. Today the village is home to almost 4000 people with 50 per cent of the population deriving an income from the art industry. While painting now represents a major, though certainly not the sole, source of income for many families, some still hold plots of agricultural land, located a few kilometres from the village,

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largely worked during harvest times by labourers and share-croppers from nearby villages, as well as by itinerant workers from the neighbouring islands of Java and Lombok.

The most lucrative form of employment for young men in the village is the cruise ship industry, with many families aspiring to send at least one son through a recruitment agent for training and eventual placement on a liner. Other young people are employed in the hotels, spas and resorts of the tourist centres, with some residing permanently in the south of the island while others commute daily to destinations as far as Jimbaran and Nusa Dua.

While older residents frequently lament the lack of interest that younger people have in becoming artists, at present several young artists do work in the village and many others are involved in the marketing and trade of Kamasan art.

During the 20th century, foreign tourists, artists and scholars were generally regarded as the mainstay of Balinese art—a development associated with the demise of traditional practice. While foreign international tourists have been important patrons of Kamasan art, over the past decade there has been a shift in the consumer base of Kamasan art to the Balinese themselves, as well as the many affluent Indonesian tourists who holiday in Bali from cities like Jakarta and Surabaya.

The art of Kamasan very much appeals to more urbanised Balinese, an appeal which can be understood in the context of media-initiated campaigns to reinvigorate traditional Balinese cultural values in the wake of the Bali bombings, the first of which traumatised the island a decade ago.

In an environment where Balinese are consciously seeking to substantiate their own cultural heritage, Kamasan art is being commissioned by individuals, schools, university campuses and government departments as well as commercial ventures like hotel and villa developments.

The classical paintings produced in Kamasan and other centres of painting in Bali have always been for ceremonial use by Balinese. Paintings commissioned for temples still account for some of the work produced in Kamasan, though most temples outside of the village have long replaced the painted cloths with cheaper screen-printed versions. Artists producing work for temples usually paint for those to which they belong within the village, most of which maintain good collections of classical paintings for use during particular ceremonies.

Colourists at work on a large cloth in the studio of artist Ni Wayan Wally.

While seemingly adhering to tradition, which is arguably what attracts people to Kamasan work, the artists are adapting to new clientele. The incongruity is not lost on the artists, many of whom acknowledge that their Balinese clients appreciate their paintings for being traditional but have limited understanding of the painted narratives themselves.

One of the largest commissions received in 2011, by artist Nyoman Mandra (b.1946), was from Mangku Made Pastika, the Governor of Bali, who requested a custom work, almost 40 metres long, depicting scenes from the epic *Mahabharata* for his private residence. Although this order was for a particularly long painting, it is not uncommon, as Balinese seek cloths to hang in specific interior spaces, particularly as ceiling panels. This has seen Kamasan artists moving away from painting the single format scenes usually associated with tourist work, to producing works on much longer and narrower lengths of cloth, known as *ider-ider*, which consist of many scenes and are customarily hung around the eaves of pavilion structures within temples.

The size of these works also requires a large number of artists and colourists. It is not uncommon for up to 10 people to be employed to produce one painting. While the communal nature of production adds to the integrity of these works as traditional products, the practice of Nyoman Mandra shows that it is possible to become the best-known individual name in Kamasan art, while heading the most important collective and studio in Kamasan today.

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It is not just the way that Kamasan artists work that is subject to ongoing modification, but the ways in which they present the narrative subjects of their paintings. A recent painting by Ni Wayan Wally (b. 1954) shows how one artist has responded to the changing Balinese landscape.

The story of the Brayut family relates the tribulations of a poor commoner and rural Balinese couple with 18 children. Artists commonly depict scenes of domestic life, including, here, husband Pan Brayut carrying water, bathing his children in the river and cooking on a wood fire.

Detail from the Brayut story by Ni Wayan Wally, 2010.

In Ni Wayan Wally's painting, tourists with cameras round their necks jostle to snap the wedding couple, and girls in bikinis share the waves with fishermen in wooden fishing boats. A trio of government officials dressed in khaki uniform arrives at the ceremony accompanied by another guest in trousers and jacket, and is greeted by two women in Balinese dress, who place a garland of flowers round the officials' necks.

Artist Ni Wayan Wally

Of course Balinese artists are not alone in incorporating contemporary commentary into their work: there are many examples in the traditional or classic arts around Indonesia of engagement by artists with the urban world. However, exploring the art of Kamasan shows that the qualities of this tradition are ambiguous. In the same way that the signs I mentioned earlier appeared to position the village as an entity in danger of being forgotten or left behind, the appeal of this art can be explained in the same terms. By exploring the kinds of engagements that artists have with the world beyond their village, it is clear that tradition is a categorisation at once embraced and contested by Kamasan artists—and that they exercise significant agency in articulating traditional culture to urban Bali.

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China pays for crimes against business

The Chinese Government is struggling to prevent crimes against businesses, according to a new study from the Australian National University.

The study, co-authored by Professor Roderic Broadhurst in the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, surveyed more than 5100 businesses in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Shenzen and Xi'an.

Professor Broadhurst said the snapshot showed that the level of crime reported by Chinese businesses was lower than other emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, Nigeria and India, and considerably lower than Western and Eastern Europe.

'However, incidents of bribery and extortion were more frequent in China than in Western Europe and Australia, but less frequent than in Eastern Europe,' Professor Broadhurst said.

More than one-quarter of businesses reported at least one incident of crime over the past year. This represents an estimated annual loss of between US$4.9 and 5.6 billion for the four cities.

The study has been published by ANU E Press as the book Business and the risk of crime in China. The book is available online.

ANU News

A Confucian approach to peace and conflict resolution

Traditional Chinese culture could offer new ways of thinking about peace and harmony.

Chengxin Pan

One received wisdom on conflict resolution and peace-building has been the 'democratic peace' theory, which argues that the norms of liberal democracy are conducive to peace and peaceful resolution of conflict.

This is not the place to debate whether this thesis is valid or not, but clearly 'democratic peace' is not the only political or ideational path to peace. Much wisdom on conflict resolution, for example, could be drawn from traditional Chinese culture, especially the Confucian thoughts on harmony and humaneness.

Chinese culture is not inherently peaceful, but it is worth exploring some important yet less understood Confucian ideas on human nature, cosmology and mutual responsiveness to help both enrich our understanding of the causes of conflict and build our capacity to resolve conflict and maintain peace.

Conventional Western theories of international relations take as their starting point that human nature is inherently selfish and thus prone to conflict. Confucianism, on the other hand, believes that conflict is not so much a result of some inherent human tendency as it is due to the lack of adequate development in human moral character. As such, conflict could be better understood and mitigated through the application of particular norms on human behaviour and social interaction.

One such norm, according to Confucianism, is *shu* (恕). Closely related with other Confucian concepts such as *ren* (humaneness), *he* (harmony), and *li* (propriety), *shu* is commonly understood as 'do not do to others what you yourself do not desire'. In the classic Confucian text *Analects*, similar expressions appear no fewer than three times (5:12; 12:2; 15:24). As an ethical code of conduct, *shu* is as relevant to the international context as it is to the domestic setting: insofar as the self would not like to be treated with violence, the self should not use it against others. In doing so, the self 'will not incur personal or political ill will'.[1] Where there is no ill will, a virtuous cycle of reciprocity between self and others may ensue, thus bringing about a necessary condition for cooperation and peace.

In addition to this 'negative' expression (e.g. what not to do to others), *shu* also takes on positive and introspective forms. In positive terms, it means 'do to others what you yourself desire'. *The Analects* describes this positive expression of *shu*, also known as *zhong*, as follows: 'The man of *jen* [*ren*] is one who, desiring to sustain himself, sustains others, and desiring to develop himself, develops others'.[2]

To drive home this message, Confucius laid out four common scenarios of *zhong* in the *Doctrine of the Mean*: 'To serve my father as I would expect my son to serve me… To serve my ruler as I would expect my ministers to serve me... To serve my elder brothers as I would expect my younger brothers to serve me… To be the first to treat friends as I would expect them to treat me'.[3]

Zhong has obvious implications for social harmony. As filial piety and fraternal love in the family context are extended to the outer and wider community, they in turn are reciprocated and multiplied, thus expanding a social web of mutual love and respect. While the negative form of *shu* can avoid provoking ill will, the positive form helps build up good will. Viewing *zhong* as reciprocal and contagious, Confucians believe that it is all the more important for people in high places, such as the king, to practise it, as his exemplary effect on others is likely to be more powerful. If the king is committed to *zhong*, he is able to rule by moral example rather than by coercion and punishment. When a follower, seeking advice about good governance, asked what if he killed those who had abandoned the way to attract those who followed it, Confucius replied that if one ruled with virtue, people

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would respond in kind—was there a need for killing?[4] The absence of coercion or violence, by implication, means the greater possibility for peace and harmony.

A third dimension of *shu*, expressed in introspective terms, refers to self-reflection or self-cultivation (*xiushen*). In *shu a*nd *zhong*, the desire of the self is used as the starting point for understanding and dealing with others. But an uncritical or unconditional reference to the self as the measure of others carries the risk of ethnocentrism, which, if disguised in universalist terms, could well lead to more, rather than less, conflict.

Thus, Confucianism takes self-reflection and self-cultivation seriously, which is believed to be the hallmark of exemplary persons (*junzi*). By self-reflection, Mencius meant that 'If others do not respond to your love with love, look into your own benevolence; if others fail to respond to your attempts to govern them with order, look into your own wisdom; if others do not return your courtesy, look into your own respect. In other words, look into yourself whenever you fail to achieve your purpose'.[5]

Without critical self-examination, one could be caught in blame game or tit-for-tat retaliation.

Self-cultivation could contribute to conflict resolution in several ways. First, self-cultivation insists that the critical condition for harmony lies in the moral agency of the self through learning and constant reflection, not in others or in certain external structure or transcendent forces. Second, by taking self-responsibility, self-cultivation lays the foundation for forgiveness, which in turn is a key to mediation and reconciliation. Confucianism argues that with self-examination, an exemplary person is able not to take offence at others' failure to recognise his/her ability, nor 'to revenge [others'] unreasonable conduct'.[6] Conversely, without critical self-examination, one could be caught in blame game or tit-for-tat retaliation.

Third, from a Confucian standpoint, self-cultivation brings about calmness, and a calm person without paranoia, xenophobia and hatred is more likely to bring themself into harmony with the environment. If each person or each country is devoted to cultivating self-virtue and examining self-conduct, order and harmony could then emerge.

To hard-nosed realists, this is at best another strand of idealism doomed to fail. Though Confucianism in general and *shu* in particular are no panacea for many social ills, they are far from another set of fanciful ideas. Two distinctive Confucian ideas make *shu* a relevant and powerful norm on conflict resolution.

First, in cosmology *shu* is underpinned by a distinct Confucianism that treats reciprocal relations as fundamental to the being of the world. Confucianism assumes an organismic, non-dualistic, and non-transcendent cosmos where heaven (*tian*), earth (*di*), and human (*ren*) together form one continuous, holistic body in which the myriad things under heaven are inherently mutually responsive. 'To be one body with the world', as the Neo-Confucianist scholar Wang Yangming explained, 'means that we even feel pain when tiles and stones are broken'.[7]

Translated sometimes as mutuality or reciprocity, *shu* speaks directly to this mutual responsiveness in human relations. To illustrate, it is useful to look at the etymological roots of *shu* (恕) in Chinese. The upper half of the character is *ru* (如), meaning 'like' or 'to resemble', and the bottom half is *xin* (心), or 'heart-and-mind'.[8] Together, this Chinese character implies that people's heart and mind is alike, hence the possibility of 'extending one's desire to others' (*shu*). By way of invoking one's own subjectivity to appreciate the situation of others, *shu* enables mutual understanding and mutual trust which is essential to harmony.

Second, *shu* is predicated on an intersubjective understanding of human nature. Whereas Western philosophy often defines human nature in terms of human desire for survival, material satisfaction and power, Confucianism argues that what makes human beings distinctively human is their desire to be treated by others as human. For Confucius, the ultimate characteristic of humaneness is people's intersubjective need for respect, trust, love and care from fellow

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humans. Becoming an exemplary person entails more than sharing 'chariots and horses, and light fur dresses' with others, or feeding one's parents with food, for 'even dogs and horses are fed'. Rather, it means, for instance, that 'in regard to the aged, to give them rest; in regard to friends, to show them sincerity; in regard to the young, to treat them tenderly'.[9] Indeed, humaneness (*ren*仁), as the graph of the Chinese character indicates, denotes at least two persons, thus symbolising 'the relationality and interdependence of human beings'.[10]

Both the Confucian cosmology of mutual responsiveness and its intersubjective conception of human nature lay the foundation for the theory and practice of *shu*. Each person, in order to become a human, entails the treatment of *shu* from others. But given the reciprocal nature of human relations, the self's clamour for *shu* from others cannot be satisfied unless the self is committed to the same practice towards others. In this sense, acting in the spirit of s*hu* is neither an exercise of pure altruism nor a sign of weakness. Rather, it is an essential step towards the self-realisation of humanity.

This, of course, does not suggest that with *shu,* an easy solution to social and international conflict is at hand. Confucius admitted that he had not been able to act fully in accordance with *shu*. However, the problem lies less in the principle of *shu* per se than in our commitment to living up to it in practice. In a world chronically ravaged with spiralling violence and intractable conflict, *shu* and Confucianism in general at least offer some much-needed alternative ways of thinking about peace and harmony.

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Education and gender balance key to continued growth of Asia's giants

A sound education will be crucial for young people in China, India and Indonesia entering the workforce.

Gavin Jones and
Divya Ramchand

Education is an important means through which the level of human capital of a country's citizens, notably its workforce, is enhanced. Human capital acquired through schooling has been shown to help rural workers find better non-farm jobs in rural areas as well as in cities.

The benefits of education also extend beyond workforce productivity to the social realm in the form of higher chances of child survival, lower maternal mortality rates, improved adult health and lower disability at old age.

Given the overall empowering function of education, it is not surprising that the goal of universal primary education was ranked second in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.

Asia's giants—China, India and Indonesia—between them hold 67 per cent of Asia's population and 41 per cent of the world's population. In these countries, as elsewhere, demographic factors play an important role in influencing education, and vice versa. For example, China's strong family planning efforts helped reduce its child dependency ratio, which in turn led to more years of schooling per child as parents channelled their wealth to fewer children.

The table below shows that over the next 20 years, the working-age population (age 15–64) in Indonesia and India is expected to rise substantially, though in Indonesia this growth will be entirely confined to the population aged 30 and above, as numbers in the 15–29 age group are expected to decline slightly. By contrast, in China the workforce will begin to contract by the year 2020, and it will be slightly smaller in 2030 than it is at present. Over the next 20 years, total dependency ratios are expected to dip in all three countries due to a strong decline in child dependency ratios that will offset a slight rise

Per cent change in working-age Population, 2010–2030

Country	Per cent changes	
	Age 15–29	Age 15–64
Indonesia	-3.1	20.0
China	-26.2	-1.1
India	8.8	31.0

Source: UN Population Division Statistics

Total Dependency Ratio



in old-age dependency ratios (not shown in the graph). This trend is often referred to as the 'demographic bonus', and is a favourable one for economic development, provided that those entering the working ages are provided with enough education and that jobs are available for them. However, within a few years, dependency ratios will begin to increase in China, and beyond 2030, they will be rising in all three countries, as old-age dependency ratios rise more sharply.

In all three countries, it is crucial that young people entering the workforce are equipped with a sound education so as to take maximum advantage of the demographic bonus in boosting the country's future productivity and enabling the working-age population to cope with the increasing burden of support which they will eventually have to bear.

At the same time, both equity and efficiency concerns require more balanced levels of educational development across the socioeconomic spectrum. Factors such as poverty, social stereotypes and poor educational facilities accessible to the poor lead to children leaving school prematurely to enter the workforce, lacking skills that would enable them to move into higher-productivity

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jobs. There are enormous losses both to the individuals concerned and to society when bright children from poor backgrounds are unable to realise their educational potential.

Education is a long-term investment associated with short-term costs. Investment in education takes almost one generation (20 years) to translate into better human capital of the adult labour force. With the lower dependency ratios expected from now to approximately 2030, this provides an opportunity to raise education enrolment ratios to boost future productivity. This is particularly important for India, which lags substantially behind Indonesia and China in both secondary school enrolment rates and in the gender balance in secondary school enrolments.

Secondary enrolment in China has doubled and in Indonesia increased by around 50 per cent over the last 20 years. In India, the corresponding increase is only around 30 per cent. Evidence shows that secondary education provides a strong boost to economic growth, much more so than universal primary education alone[1], due to the more specific skills taught that meet the demands of the industrial and commercial sectors.

School enrollment, secondary (% gross)



Ratio of female to male secondary enrollment (%)



A closer look at gender differences in secondary school enrolment reveals that significantly lower female to male enrolment accounts for a large portion of the lower enrolment rates in India. These gender differences stem from sociocultural norms in India relating to the role which women are expected to play in society.

The situation is different in Indonesia where Indonesian parents treat sons and daughters equally in schooling investment and this is not affected by whether daughters move away from the original household.[2] Ensuring that India's overall enrolment rate improves will depend on the ability to boost female secondary enrolment rates, as Indonesia succeeded in doing following its introduction of three years of compulsory junior secondary education in 1994. Between 1993 and 2007, the reduction of a gender gap in secondary enrolments contributed significantly to the rise in Indonesia's overall enrolment.[3]

India is lagging behind China and Indonesia in this respect and this lag is likely to continue well into the future due to the path dependency of education—the effects of a poor education stay with an individual for life and linger for decades in holding back the productivity of the workforce. Evidence also points towards a correlation between parent education and child enrolment in secondary schools, thus indicating an intergenerational transmission of educational advantage and disadvantage.

China and Indonesia, too, still face many educational challenges. Indonesia still has enormous room for improvement in

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developing the quality of the education systems, teaching standards, test scores etc. to ensure that the years of compulsory schooling are meaningful and effective.[4]

Given the important role of education in development, focusing on expanding and upgrading education and improving the gender balance are crucial to improving total productivity in Asia's giants relative to other countries.

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Books on Asia

From the Asia Bookroom

Sally Burdon
Asia Bookroom

Worldwide, there is an increasing interest in historical images and the history of photography in general.

Nineteenth-century albumen photographs, both as individual images and presented together in albums, have become very desirable in the past few decades and are starting to attract some solid prices recently. Photographs of Asia reflect this trend.

The earliest recorded photograph taken in China was in 1842 and within a few years Chinese photographers and foreign visitors were taking photographs of every subject imaginable, from tortures and punishments to grand occasions, battles and portraiture.

As a dealer in old books and other old paper items I have followed the interest in photography with acute interest. In the last few months, for example, we sold a late 19th-century colonial album of Burmese interest and two albums of Singaporean interest.

One Singaporean album was from the turn of the 20th century and another, much later, from the 1950s. The photographs in these albums were not by famous photographers but by skilled amateurs depicting a way of life quite unfamiliar to modern eyes, and each was a fascinating historical 'document' in its own right.

Clearly, the 'serious money' lies with the images by the famous photographers such as Felice Beato, known, among other things, for his photographs of the Second Opium War; John Thomson, for his haunting portraits of Chinese life; or Lai Chong, famous for having taken the first dated photograph by a Chinese photographer. Even if you can't afford to chase original photographs by well-known photographers or the work of amateurs, I would highly recommend that you get hold of some of the excellent books on the subject that have been published recently. A selection



of some very good ones includes Terry Bennett's two standard reference volumes, *History of photography in China 1842–1860*



and *History of photography in China. Western photographers 1861–1879*.

Other outstanding collections by Bennett are *Early Japanese images* and *Korea caught in time.* Yet more volumes include Joel G. Montague's *Picture postcards of Cambodia 1900–1950*; Clare Harris's and Tsering Shakya's *Seeing Lhasa;* Anne Lacoste's *Felice Beato: a photographer on the Eastern Road;* Jason Toh's *Singapore through 19th century photographs; Indonesia images from the past—the photography of Jean Demmeni;* John Falconer's *India: pioneering photographers 1850-1900;* and *A century of Japanese photography* from the Japan Photographers Association.



Diary notes



'Tagore and the Romance of Travel Exhibition', 23 April–25 April, 12pm–5pm, Founders Gallery, Elizabeth Murdoch Building, Victorian College of the Arts, 234 St Kilda Road, Southbank, Melbourne. Organised by

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the Australia India Institute in association with the Consulate General of India, Melbourne, the exhibition marks the 150th anniversary of the birth of Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore and is an initiative of the Indian Council of Cultural Relations. It has been exhibited in Malaysia, Thailand, China and Singapore.

'**Reading Dutch for historical research', intensive residential course, to be held at South Durras, NSW, 18 June–5 July 2012.** The course is intended for those needing a working knowledge of written Dutch for professional purposes, including the study of Asian history. Open to academics, professionals and current and intending postgraduate students. See website for further information.

Australian Historical Association 31st Annual Conference 9-13 July 2012, Adelaide, at the North Terrace campus, University of Adelaide. The conference seeks to explore the myriad ways in which human societies have connected over past centuries, and the ways these interactions in time, space and cultures inform present historical debate. We welcome papers from historians of all times and places. Further information available from conference website.

ASAA 19th Biennial Conference—'Knowing Asia—Asian Studies in an Asian century'—University of Western Sydney, **11–13 July 2012.** See story page 4.

ASAA news

ASAA announces mid-career prizes

From 2012, the Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA) will award two mid-career researcher prizes for excellence in Asian Studies ($1500 and $1000).

The awards will be made to mid-career researchers for published work on an Asian subject, as represented in a book/monograph. Individual or joint candidates may nominate for the prizes. Applicants must be ASAA members employed generally at an Australian university below level E (professor/chair) at the time of application. They must have completed their PhD at least five years and no more than 15 years before the application is lodged.

Individuals may submit a sole-authored scholarly book (which must not be based on a thesis) published by a university or commercial press in the three years before the application is submitted. Joint candidates may submit a co-authored book published in the three years before the application is submitted. Materials submitted *must be in print* as of the date of submission (galley proofs are not acceptable).

Applications should be submitted by 15 May 2012 to Professor Purnendra Jain
President, ASAA
Centre for Asian Studies
University of Adelaide

Purnendra.jain@adelaide.edu.au

For further information, contact Dr Caroline Norma at:caroline.norma@rmit.edu.au or see the website.

Applications open for ASAA event funding

Applications are open to ASAA members who wish to organise a workshop, symposium or conference that will be of interest and value to other ASAA members and the broader scholarly community.

The ASAA Executive will appoint a small committee of ASAA Council members to review applications on their merits. In assessing proposals, attention will be given to the overall integrity of the proposal in terms of the criteria set out below, including the soundness of the budget and its justification.

Please email applications as Word or PDF attachments to Amrita.Malhi@unisa.edu.au by Friday 18 May 2012. Applicants should expect to receive responses by 30 June 2012.See ASAA website for full details.

About the ASAA

The Asian Studies Association of Australia promotes the study of Asian languages, societies, cultures, and politics in Australia, supports teaching and research in Asian studies and works towards an understanding of Asia in the community at large. *Asian Currents* is published by the ASAA and edited by Allan Sharp.